本文旨在厘清、辨析和评价森与罗尔斯间有关正义标准的争论，讨论森的能力路径能否（如果可以，在何种意义上）替代罗尔斯的基本益品路径。在第一节，我澄清了可作为正义标准选项的四个基本观念，基本益品、效用、能力与功能性活动。第二和第三节检验森对基本益品路径的三个批评，有关人的根本利益、指标的灵活性和严重残障者的情形。第四节则探讨罗尔斯对森的能力路径的两个指控，有关中立性与可行性，并简要评价能力路径的价值。本文的结论是，森的能力路径无法取代但可以补充罗尔斯的基本益品路径。

   The purpose of this paper is to clarify, analyze and evaluate the debate between Sen and Rawls on the criterion of justice, and to discuss whether Sen's capability approach can (if so, in what sense) replace Rawls's primary goods approach. In section 1, I clarify the four basic concepts that can be used as options for the standard of justice: primary goods, utility, capability, and functioning. Sections II and III examine Sen's three critiques of the primary goods approach, relating to fundamental human advantages, the flexibility of the index, and the situation of people with severe disabilities. The fourth section discusses Rawls' two charges against Sen's capability approach, which are about its neutrality and feasibility, and briefly evaluates the value of the capability approach. The conclusion of this paper is that Sen's capability approach cannot replace but can complement Rawls's primary goods approach.

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