本文从管理学视角出发，结合上世纪80年代以来的实证研究文献，对高管薪酬研究的理论基础、高管薪酬的影响因素以及高管薪绩相关性等问题进行综述，提出本领域内未来研究的五个关键问题。理论背景的讨论中创新的将管理学、社会学、经济学三种不同视角加以对比归纳。在薪酬-绩效问题上提出了中介因素对敏感性的影响。

With the reference of empirical study literature from 1980’s, this paper reviews the research outcomes about executive compensation from domestic and overseas scholars, regards the theoretical basis of executive compensation, the influence factors of executive compensation and the sensitivity between executive pay and firm performance. Further, five key problems with respect to the executive compensation are risen for future study.

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