本文将主要基于《阿毗达磨俱舍论》的《破执我品》重构补特伽罗论（pudgalavāda）的论述，并考察两种对补特伽罗论的辩护方案的优劣。本文第一章将介绍《破执我品》在记载补特伽罗论的文献中的地位以及论主世亲关于“无我”（anātman）的主张。第二章将探讨犊子部提出的两种成立补特伽罗的路径，由此讨论一种完备的补特伽罗论应坚持的主张及其对世亲理论的挑战。第三章将分析犊子部成立补特伽罗论的理由及其对世亲无我论的批评，从而总结出补特伽罗论至少应该满足的期待和应坚持的理论底线。第四章将考察辩护补特伽罗的积极方案和消极方案，并分析为什么这些方案都不足以辩护补特伽罗论。最后，本文将从佛教思想史内部视角重思补特伽罗论的价值，并检讨上述讨论模式可能的缺陷，分析为补特伽罗进一步辩护的可能。

This article would reconstruct the arguments of Pudgalavāda mainly basing on ātmavādaprati?edha in Abhidharmako?abhā?ya, and investigate the advantages and disadvantages of two programs for defending Pudgalavāda. The first chapter would introduce the position of ātmavādaprati?edha among the literatures having recorded Pudgalavāda and its author Vasubandhu’s theory about “no self ”(anātman). The second chapter aims to talk about two ways to establish pudgalavāda from Vātsīputrīya. Then to talk aobut the propositions which a good Pudgalavāda should insist and their challenges to Vasubandhu’ s theory.  The third chapter analyses the reasons why Vātsīputrīya   established the pudgalavāda and it’s criticizes for Vasubandhu, so that we can find out the expectations and theoretical end line that Pudgalavāda should meet at least. The forth chapter would investigate the positive and negative programs for defending pudgala and point out the reasons why they were either enough for defending Pudgalavāda. Finally this articale would rethink the value of Pudgalavāda, review the possible defects of the above discussion defences, and analyze the possibility of further defending pudgala.

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