报应论长期作为刑罚正当性的理论依据，然而其富有争议的哲学基础也常面临严峻的诘问，其中最为突出的便是决定论对自由意志可能的排挤进而对责任的概念的否定；责任的概念一旦无法得到维持，正在进行的刑罚实践会立刻陷入两难的境地，带来严重的正当化难题。对于责任与决定性的世界之间的关系，历来有三种基本主张，本文首先指出只有其中的相容论主张才有助于责任概念的维持。然而尽管责任概念的支持者已经构建了复杂的、对责任和决定论的相容性理论，但其反对者也代不乏人。本文继而着重考察派莱布姆的“四例论证”对相容论的攻击，通过探究其起源指出其相较前代攻击方法的强有力之处，并通过梳理柔性和刚性两种针对“四例论证”基本的反驳意见，证明在“四例论证”的语境下维护责任的概念并非不可能，其中柔性回应的表现大体令人满意，而刚性回应能真正发挥作用还有待其支持者的改进。

   Retributivism has been regarded as one of the most important justifications of criminal penalty for centuries. Its controversially philosophical foundation, however, is highly contested such as, prominently, the denial of responsibility under the attack against free will by determinism; once the concept of responsibility collapsed, the current social practices of criminal penalty would promptly be stuck. There have already been three basic propositions about the relationship between responsibility and the deterministic world, among which only the compatibilist proposition can be helpful for us to sustain the concept of responsibility. But this is far from adequacy: opponents of responsibility arise by generations although those supporters have established complicated theories of compatibilism between responsibility and determinism. Then I will focus on how Pereboom attacks compatibilism with “four-case argument”: pointing out its advantages than former attempts by clarifying its origin; proving it is not impossible for compatiblists to advocate for responsibility against that route after investigating two basic kinds of refutations, soft- and hard-line. I will finally conclude that the soft-line reply is generally satisfying while the hard-line can do nothing useful unless getting improved by its backers.

一、中文著作

1．张明楷：《刑法学》（第五版），法律出版社2016年版

二、中文期刊论文

2. 陈兴良：《刑罚目的新论》，载《华东政法学院学报》2001年第3期，第3-9页

3．徐向东：《来源的不相容论与道德责任》，载《世界哲学》2018年第5期，第56-65页

三、外文著作（不同作者文献按第一作者姓氏首字母为序，同一作者文献按发表年度为序）

4.John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: a Theory of Moral Responsibility, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

5.Brent Gartland, ed., Neuroscience and the Law: Brian, Mind and the Scales of Justice, New York: Dana Press, 2004.

6.Ishtiyaque Haji, Incompatibilism’s Allure: Principle Argument for Incompatibilism, Toronto: Broadview Press, 2009.

7.Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

8.Michael Pardo, Dennis Patterson, Minds, Brians, and Law, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

9.Dennis Patterson, Michael Pardo, ed., Law and Neuroscience: the Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

10.Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

11.David Widerker, Michael McKenna, ed., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006.

三、外文期刊论文及百科（排序方式同外文著作）

12.Kristin Demetriou, “The Soft-Line Resolution to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument”, Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.88, No.4 (2010), pp.595-617.

13.Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Philosophy, Vol.66 (1966), pp.830-840

14.Joshua Greene, Jonathan Cohen, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything”, Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, Vol. 359, No. 1451, Law and the Brian (Nov.29, 2004), ppp. 1775-1785.

15.Michael McKenna, “Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, And the Transfer of Non-Responsibility”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.38, No.1 (2001), pp.37-51.

16.Michael McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.77, No.1 (2008), pp.142-159.

17.Michael McKenna, “Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard-Liner Takes It on the Chin”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.89, No.2 (2014), pp.467-484.

18.Michael McKenna, D. Justin Coates, "Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

19.Alfred Mele, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases”, The Philosophical Review, Vol.107, No.1 (1998), pp.97-112.

20.Alfred Mele, “A Critique of Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument for Incompatibilism”, Analysis, Vol.65, No.1 (2005), pp.75-80.

21.Stephen Morse, “Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience”, Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol.9, No.1 (2008), pp.1-37.

22.Derk Pereboom, “A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Argument Manipulation Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.77, No.1 (2008), pp.160-170.

23.Saul Smilansky, “Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical ‘Reductio’”, Law and Philosophy, Vol. 30, No.3 (2011), pp.353-367.

24.Chandra Sekhar Sripada, “What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol.85, No.3 (2012), pp.1-31.

25.Alec Walen, “Retributive Justice”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

26.David Widerker, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”, The Philosophical Review, Vol.104, No.2 (1995), pp.247-261.