面对知觉的认知渗透性对知觉辩护效力的挑战，知觉哲学家苏珊娜·西格尔提出知觉合理性理论，构造出一套依据知觉形成过程来判断知觉认知态的概念框架。她主张并非所有受认知渗透的知觉经验的辩护效力都会被削弱，知觉的认知效力取决于产生知觉的推断过程是否适当。这一理论试图在保留知觉经验基本辩护效力的前提下，为部分认知渗透下知觉经验辩护失效的情况提供解释，并为个体应对知觉经验承担认知责任创造前提。本文将概述西格尔的知觉合理性理论，并论证，西格尔有效地通过区分适当与不当的推断过程，在知觉的认知渗透性的挑战下捍卫了知觉经验的基本认知效力，不过，这一理论对于个体应就知觉经验担负认知责任的辩护并不成功。

Facing the challenge to the epistemic power of perception from cognitive penetration, Susanna Siegel constructs a conceptual framework to evaluate the epistemic standings of perceptual experiences according to how those experiences are formed. She argues that not all penetrated perceptual experiences lose epistemic power, and that the degree of epistemic power of perception depends on whether the inferential processes are appropriate or not. Siegel attempts to explain why some penetrated perception lose justification power while preserves the basic justification power of perceptual experience. Besides, she attempts to open the door for individuals’ epistemic responsibility for perceptual experiences. In this paper, I review Siegel’s theory and argue that Siegel successfully defends the basic justification power of perception by distinguishing between rational and irrational inferential processes. However, I think Siegel doesn’t successfully defend that individuals should take epistemic responsibility for perceptual experience.

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