- 无标题文档
查看论文信息

中文题名:

 我国私募股权投资中对赌协议制定原则的相关探究    

姓名:

 王皓一    

学生类型:

 学士    

学位名称:

 经济学学士    

学校:

 中国人民大学    

院系:

 财政金融学院    

专业:

 金融学    

第一导师姓名:

 李凤云    

完成日期:

 2015    

中文关键词:

 私募股权投资 对赌协议 投资方 融资方    

中文摘要:
对赌协议在私募股权投资中多被用以解决投资方与融资方在对价过程中因信息不对称产生的价值评估分歧。为了探究我国私募股权投资中对赌协议的制定原则,本文首先介绍了对赌协议的制定基础,将对赌协议按照不同的对赌主体、对赌内容与对赌对象进行分类。接着根据对赌协议的概念与制定目的,对对赌对象分别为股权的赔偿与现金的赔偿的两类对赌协议的制定方式进行理论分析,并通过讨论两个私募股权投资中的对赌协议案例——蒙牛乳业案例与中国永乐案例来检验理论分析的合理性。最后探讨融资方在签订对赌协议时的策略及需要注意的问题。 Valuation Adjustment Mechanism (VAM) is mostly used to resolve the differences between investors and financing side in Private Equity (PE)’s consideration process caused by information asymmetry. In order to study the principle of making the VAM which belongs to PE taking place in China, this paper introduces the basis of making the VAM first, classifies the VAM by different subjects, contents and objects. According to the concept and the purpose of VAM, this paper figures out the theoretical analysis of making the VAM whose objects are equity compensation and cash compensation, and check the rationality of the theoretical analysis by discussing two VAM cases-- Mengniu Dairy and China Paradise Electronics Retail. Finally, this paper lays a foundation for discussing the strategies and problems needed attention when the financiers sign the VAM.
开放日期:

 2016-03-21    

无标题文档

   建议浏览器: 谷歌 火狐 360请用极速模式,双核浏览器请用极速模式