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中文题名:

 开放式基金投资与上市公司治理绩效关系的实证分析    

姓名:

 吕忠悦    

学科名称:

 金融工程    

学生类型:

 学士    

学位名称:

 经济学学士    

学校:

 中国人民大学    

院系:

 财政金融学院    

专业:

 金融工程    

第一导师姓名:

 魏丽    

完成日期:

 2016-05-09    

提交日期:

 2016-05-09    

中文关键词:

 开放式基金 公司治理 公司绩效    

外文关键词:

  Open-end Funds Corporate governance Corporate performance    

中文摘要:

        在经历了2008年金融危机之后4-5年的低迷,开放式基金已重新成为我国融资市场上的重要投资者。开放式基金因其机构投资者的性质与独特的赎回机制特点,既有条件又有动力去持有公司股权并积极参与公司治理,但这一预想的治理效果似乎并没能实现。本文使用2012年以来13个季度的面板数据,通过实证分析考察了开放式基金向行业的资金流入对行业企业的公司治理水平与公司绩效的影响。本文指出,开放式基金的资金流入虽然提高了公司绩效,但并没有对公司治理水平产生显著影响,这意味着开放式基金的在投资决策中更倾向于追涨杀跌的投机性投资,缺少对实体经济的结构性支持。

外文摘要:

After the downturn since 2008 financial crisis for 4 to 5 years, The Open-end Funds return to the market as a group of refreshed investors. The Open-end Funds are both conditional and willing to hold equity in company and be active in corporate governance for its features that are common with other institutional investors or unique. However, the expecting governance effect seems not to be achieved. This paper dealt with 11 quarterly panel data to complete an empirical analysis on the Open-end Funds cash flow influence on corporate governance and performance. We find that corporate performance has a positive relationship with the Open-end Funds cash flow, but a vague one with governance. The outcome shows that the Open-end Funds prefer short-term chase sell in their investment decision, ignoring structural support to real economy.

总页码:

 11    

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开放日期:

 2016-05-10    

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