& ltp& gt19世纪90年代以来，股权激励政策在美国开始得到了广泛的运用；20世纪以来，我国公司对股权激励的使用也大幅度增长。随着股权激励方式的普及，相关的学术研究也越来越丰富和深入。部分研究者关注于股权激励对高管行为的影响，间接反映股权激励是否真正能够对公司价值和股东权益的增长起作用。& lt/p& gt & ltp& gt本文一方面对股权激励与高管行为的研究进行了综述和梳理，同时也进一步总结了这类研究发展的特点和方向。本文综述的高管行为包括风险承担、投资行为、盈余管理、会计重述、自愿性换届、创新活动等等，这些研究的发展有助于丰富我们对股权激励作用的理解。在文章的最后部分，笔者还总结了此类研究的发展特点，主要有从外生视角逐渐转向内生视角，越来越关注于股权激励契约结构的内部要素等。& lt/p& gt & ltp& gt & lt/p& gt & ltp& gt关键词：股权激励高管行为风险承担盈余管理& lt/p& gt

& ltp& gtAbstract& lt/p& gt & ltp& gtSince the 1990s, equity incentive policy has prevailed in the American corporations. The use of equity incentive has gradually increased in China since the 2000s, too. In the meanwhile, the research related to it has grown deeper and more extensive. Some researches focus on the effect of equity incentive on utive behavior, indirectly reflecting whether the use of equity incentive can increase the value of the firm and shareholders&rsquo wealth.& lt/p& gt & ltp& gtIn this paper, I reviewed and sorted the researches on the effect of equity incentive on utive behavior, and further summarize the developing acteristics and direction of these researches. Executive behaviors in this paper include risk-taking, investing, earning management, restatement, voluntarily turnover, innovation activities, etc. The development of the research is helpful to understanding the effect of the equity incentive. The last section undergoes summary and discussion of the development acteristics of the researches, for example, the perspective of exogenous gradually turned to endogenous, more and more attention payed to the internal factors of equity incentive contract, etc.& lt/p& gt & ltp& gt & lt/p& gt & ltp& gtKey Words: Equity incentive utive behavior risk-taking earning management& lt/p& gt

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