摘要

1994年实行分税制改革以来，地方债风险问题日益凸显。在中国现有的以经济指标为主要考核标准的晋升机制之下，地方官员为赢得其任期内的晋升机会，会倾向于过度出让土地且大规模增加地方债务，最终导致地方债务的风险极大地增加。本文通过对建立相应的地方债务风险模型，并对除西藏以外中国30个省、市的官员升迁以及面板数据进行实证分析，得出官员升迁以及地方过度出让土地的行为会加剧地方债务风险的结论。并在此基础上提出了为减小地方债务的风险，保障地方财政系统的安全，国家应当改革现有的官员升迁体制，将更多的指标纳入考核体系中来，同时要严厉打击地方政府过度出让土地的行为，加大对地方债务的监管力度，完善地方债务风险评估机制的建议。

Abstract

Since the Tax Distribution has been carried out in 1994, the risk of local debt has become more and more serious in China. Under the promotion system  which regards economic indicators as the main standard of officials’ promotion assessment, in order to be promoted when their terms of office are finished, local officials are always prone to transfer land deucedly and raise a loan on a large scale, which will lead to the increase of local debt’s risk remarkably at last. This paper concludes that the promotion of local officials and the action of transferring land lavishly will aggravate the risk of local debt to a large extent through establishing appropriate debt-risk model and analyzing the panel data of 30 provinces and cities of China. What’s more, this paper has made some suggestions about how to decrease the risk of local debt and guarantee the security of local financial system on the basics of above analysis, such as changing the officials’ promotion institution, absorbing more indicators into officials’ promotion assessment, prohibiting the behavior of transferring land without any control strictly, regulating local debt severely, completing the system of risk assessment and so on.

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